Verification Challenges After U.S. Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Sites

While President Donald Trump has hailed the recent strike on three Iranian nuclear sites as a success, verifying the destruction of uranium stockpiles poses significant challenges for U.S. and international intelligence agencies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been unable to inspect the damage to the U.S. military’s principal target, the Fordow uranium enrichment facility, deeply buried inside a mountain in central Iran. Consequently, the IAEA cannot independently confirm Trump’s assertion that the site was ‘obliterated.’

> “At this time, no one, including the IAEA, is in a position to have fully assessed the underground damage at Fordow,” stated Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, during a Reuters interview on Monday.

Despite a sophisticated airstrike, experts suggest that the crux of the matter is not just what was targeted but also whether it was effectively destroyed.

“It will take time, intelligence assessments, and satellite imagery to determine the extent of the damage,” said Jeffrey Fields, Professor of International Relations at USC, in an interview with Decrypt. “Once that’s clear, we can evaluate whether we significantly crippled or destroyed Iran’s ability to continue enriching uranium.”

While images of explosions may show structural damage, traditional satellite imagery cannot visually confirm uranium destruction, nor is there a single tool capable of verifying its elimination from afar.

Radiation Detection from Drones and Aircraft

Specialized drones and aircraft can carry radiation sensors capable of detecting gamma rays or neutrons. However, these aircraft must fly extremely close to the ground—within mere thousands of a mile—to effectively detect and map radioactive sources, increasing their risk of attack.

Air Sampling and Downwind Analysis

To detect radioactive releases, the U.S. Air Force employs the WC-135 “Constant Phoenix”—fixed-wing aircraft based on the Boeing 707 designed to collect atmospheric samples and analyze radioactive isotopes, provided winds carry the particles far enough. This aircraft played a vital role in tracking radioactive debris from the Chernobyl disaster.

“During the Cold War, before we understood the environmental damage of atmospheric nuclear tests, the U.S. did it, and so did other countries,” noted Fields. “Those tests released radioactive isotopes into the air, which could be detected. With underground tests, that’s much harder.” The depth of the Fordow facility, reported to be 80 to 90 meters (approximately 260 to 295 feet) underground, complicates detection further.

Neutrino Detectors

Neutrino detectors are highly sensitive devices capable of identifying particles from nuclear reactions. Though promising for long-range monitoring, their practical use remains largely experimental, as they need to be positioned relatively close—within about 56 miles—to be effective.

Hyperspectral Imaging and Indirect Clues

Satellites and drones equipped with hyperspectral sensors cannot detect uranium directly but can recognize indirect indicators of activity, such as heat signatures or disturbed terrain. These clues may suggest that a facility was struck, though they cannot confirm what was inside. Moreover, combining these technologies with machine learning and artificial intelligence can assist in identifying structural changes or vehicle movements that might indicate blast effects.

The Limits of Technology

While AI and satellite imagery can help gauge the accuracy of strikes, confirming the destruction of Iran’s nuclear capabilities may necessitate an on-the-ground inspection.

“We need to try to go back to the negotiating table as soon as possible. We must allow IAEA inspectors to return,” Grossi stated. “The IAEA is ready to play its indispensable role in this process. We are negotiating with Iran and the United States and must work towards peace.”

Edited by Josh Quittner and Sebastian Sinclair